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Agricultural cooperatives play a vital role in U.S. agribusiness and function as an 
extension of farm businesses. There are nearly 30,000 U.S. cooperatives operating 
throughout the U.S. with more than $3 trillion, in assets (Deller et al., 2009).  These user 
owned firms account for nearly $654 billion in revenue, return $79 billion in patronage 
refunds and dividends, and create over 2 million jobs (Deller et al., 2009).  In Oklahoma 
there are over 200 different cooperatives; of which, 64 are farm supply/marketing 
cooperatives.  These 64 cooperatives create over $700 million in revenue, are comprised 
of over 38,000 members and employ over 1,250 people (Deller et al., 2009).  In addition 
to their roles in U.S. Agribusiness, cooperatives function as an extension of farm 
businesses by helping producers manage risk.  Agricultural cooperatives help producers 
achieve economies of scale and scope in sourcing inputs and in marketing and handling 
commodities.  Cooperatives can also help producers reduce and manage risk associated 
with their farming operation by pooling commodities and/or input purchases and by 
offering options like forward pricing and pricing contracts (Kenkel & Parrish, 2013).  
Fluctuations in grain prices, grain volume, fertilizer price, fertilizer volume, fuel price, 
fuel inventory and other farm supplies represent major sources of for grain marketing and
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farm supply cooperatives.  These producer-owned firms could benefit from better 
understanding of the risks facing their cooperatives. 
 Enterprise risk management (ERM) provides a framework for risk management 
that assesses and analyzes the broad spectrum of risks facing an organization.  An 
important aspect of the philosophy of ERM is that risk management should be integrated 
across the organization rather than in individual “silos” of business activity.  ERM also 
includes the entire spectrum of risks including hazard risks, financial risks, operational 
risks and strategic risk.  ERM provides a transparent understanding of the risk facing an 
organization and how multiple risks can simultaneously impact the firm.  It also considers 
an organization’s risk appetite and capacity.  Due to these contributions, ERM is 
becoming an essential and expected best management practice for major publicly traded 
firms (Brodeur et. al., 2010). 
 ERM could be an extremely valuable tool for agricultural cooperatives.  Farmer 
owned cooperatives face unprecedented risks due to input and commodity price 
fluctuations.  CoBank and other lenders are requiring their cooperative borrowers to 
increase risk capacity by substantially increasing equity and/or changing business 
practices to transfer risk to the customer members.  Because this equity must be 
generated out of the profit stream, these strategies have implications for cash patronage 
and the cooperative’s ability to redeem previously issued equities.  Unlike other 
agribusinesses, a cooperative’s owners are also customers and risk management strategies 
that transfer risk from the firm to the customer do not meet the overall needs of the 
customer owners.  In order to implement ERM, cooperatives need quantitative analysis of 
the risks facing the firm and the impact of risk mitigation strategies on the cooperative 
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and member owner.  This allows for a better understanding of how each enterprise 
impacts the overall structure of the cooperative.  
Research Objectives 
 The overall objective of this research is to apply the principles of ERM to grain 
marketing and farm supply cooperative.  This is accomplished through four specific 
objectives: (1) To model the major risk areas impacting grain marketing and farm supply 
cooperatives, (2) To investigate the correlation between risk components (3) To 
determine the impacts of each risk component on the cooperative’s overall risk and (4) to 
determine the impact of management decisions such as profit distribution and equity 







REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Enterprise Risk Management 
 Risk management has always been an important topic for agricultural 
cooperatives and other agribusinesses because they operate in risky environments.  While 
investor owned agribusinesses have incorporated both traditional and more innovative 
risk management tools, agricultural cooperatives have been slower to adopt more 
complex risk management practices (Manfredo, Richards, McDermott 2003).  The slower 
adoption of more complex risk management practices by agricultural cooperatives could 
be because the boards of directors are unfamiliar with these techniques or because they 
have incomplete understanding of the risks facing the cooperative.  Either of these 
possibilities suggests a need to investigate the risks facing agricultural cooperatives and 
how ERM could be applied to these firms.  Puccia, Ingram, and Dreyer (2008) and other 
authors argue that ERM can be an effective way to create a strong strategic risk 
management function that can cover the entire enterprise.  However, they also state that 




There are several factors that suggest that ERM could represent an opportunity for 
agricultural cooperatives.  First a number of new contingent clam contracts have become 
available in the capital market (Pilcher, Burkart, and Edmond 2011; Zeuli 1999).  These 
contracts make it possible for cooperatives to mitigate risks in prices, commodity volume 
and even weather.  Furthermore, recent advancement in technology proves modeling 
tools that can run complicated risk analysis for multiple areas of risk like: hazard, 
catastrophes, financial, interest rates movements, and other risk (D’Arcy 2001).   These 
technologies make it easier for a cooperative board of directors, or other decision makers 
to understand the risk facing the firm and to apply the eight interrelated components of 
ERM in an efficient manner (Steinberg et. Al., 2004).   
The advancement of these modeling technologies allowed Manfredo, Richards, 
and McDermott (2003) to conduct simulations to describe the effects of different size of 
coop, key risk factors, specific risk strategies started an evaluation of procedures (2003, 
p. 2).  This simulation approach provides a foundation for the current research on 
applying ERM to agricultural cooperatives.   
Background on Cooperative Structure 
 As stated previously, U.S. agricultural cooperatives are firms owned by their 
member owners.  Those member-owners are agricultural producers who do business with 
the cooperative by purchasing inputs and/or marketing agricultural commodities.  Input 
supply and commodity marketing cooperatives in the U.S. were formed to help their 
producer owners achieve economies of scale and scope, helping mitigate risks in the 
producers’ own operations.  These cooperatives return profits to their member owners in 
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proportion to the amount of business volume conducted by the member.  This profit 
distribution is called patronage and can be returned in a combination of cash and stock.   
In the U.S. many agricultural cooperatives are members of larger cooperatives 
which provide further economies of scale.  Under this structure, termed the federal 
system, farmers are direct members of local cooperatives and the local cooperatives are 
often a member of one or more larger regional cooperatives.  Most local cooperatives 
started with a single location, but many have grown to multiple locations through internal 
growth and mergers with other cooperatives.  The size, complexity and trade territory of 
the local cooperative influences its risk exposure.  Like the local cooperatives, federated 
cooperatives distribute patronage to local cooperatives in combination of cash and stock 
and stock is eventually redeemed under the regional cooperative’s equity management 
system.  All of those actions have impacts on the cash flow of the local cooperative and 
must be considered in simulations and other financial projections.   
While there are different variations of cooperative structures most input supply 
and commodity marketing cooperatives in the U.S. Operate under a structure called open 
membership cooperative.  Under this structure, producers can join at any time.  In order 
to become a voting member and able to receive patronage from the cooperative they must 
submit a membership application for board approval and purchase a membership share.  
In most cases membership investment can range from $50-$100 for many grain and farm 
supply cooperatives.  This membership investment is usually set by the board of directors 
for the individual cooperative.  Most of the equity in an open membership cooperatives is 




Overview of Cooperative Finance 
 The patronage distribution structure creates unique features by which 
cooperatives can acquire equity capital (Kenkel 2015).  There are three primary ways 
members provide equity to their respective cooperatives which are direct investments, 
retained margins, and per-unit capital retains.  Cooperatives also acquire equity by 
retained earnings on non-member patronage business.  
“In the traditional open membership cooperative most of the equity is created by 
retaining profits.  This process is accomplished in three ways: (1) Retaining a 
portion of patronage refunds and issuing equity shares to members instead of 
cash patronage, (2) Retaining profits from member business, paying corporate 
taxes on the profits and retaining the after-tax portion as unallocated reserves 
(retaining earnings); and (3) Retaining profits from nonmember business, paying 
corporate taxes on the profits and retaining the after tax portion as unallocated 
reserves.  Profit distribution and retention decisions are at the discretion of the 
board of directors and impact the cooperative’s balance sheet and cash flow as 







ENTERPRISE RISK AMANGEMENT 
 
Definition. 
 All business enterprises are impacted by events which can have negative or 
positive impact.  While in a broad sense the possibility of either negative or positive 
outcomes can be described as risk, most business managers refer to the possibility of 
negative outcomes (downside risk) as risk and positive outcomes as opportunities.  
Business risks can involve anything that decreases the financial performance of the firm 
or damages its reputation.   
Throughout the years businesses have used a variety of techniques to analyze and 
control risk.  These have included identifying insurable hazards and purchasing 
appropriate levels of insurance, developing internal controls to limit unauthorized actions 
and protecting against unfavorable price movements through futures market positions and 
options.  In recent years many firms have adopted a more comprehensive approach to 
identifying and controlling risks, which in referred to as (ERM).  
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ERM has been defined as: 
“A process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify 
potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk 
appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity 
objectives” (Steinberg, et. al., 2004). 
ERM is a broad spectrum approach that integrates the concepts of internal controls 
and strategic planning.  ERM involves assessing all of the risks facing an organization 
and selecting a risk response strategy for the risk identified.  A variety of organizations 
have suggested specific ERM frameworks for classifying and managing risk. The 
Causality Actuarial Society (2003) suggested classifying risk as: 
(1) Hazard risk such as property damage, natural catastrophe and liability torts, 
(2) Financial risk such as price risks, asset risk, currency risk and liquidity risk,  
(3) Operational risk such as customer satisfaction, product failure, integrity, 
reputational risk and knowledge drain and 
(4) Strategic risks such as competition, social trends and capital availability. 
Under ERM the decision makers first identify their risk appetite.  An organizations 
risk appetite can be defined as the amount and types of risks that it is willing to take in 
order to meet their strategy objectives.  Organizations have different risk appetites 
depending on their sector, culture and objectives (Causality Actuarial Society, 2003).  
While risk appetite is related to the aggregate amount of risk an organization is willing to 
take on is inter-related with the concept of “risk capacity” which is a measure of the 
organization’s ability to withstand negative events without seriously jeopardizing its key 
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goals.  After an organization determines its risk appetite, it identifies and quantifies the 
risks including the interactions and correlations across the identified risks.  The final step 
of ERM is then to respond to the identified risks. 
 ERM strategies for responding to risks are also described under various 
frameworks.  In general they involve: 
(1) Avoidance: exiting the activities that create the risk 
(2) Reduction: taking action to reduce the likelihood or impact of the risk 
(3) Transfer: insuring or transferring all or a part of the risk to another party 
(4) Accept: taking no action to change the risk due a cost/benefit decision 
Interpretation and implementation of ERM varies across sectors.  In the context of 
financial institutions ERM has generally focused on quantifying and correlating the risks 
relating to the portfolio of financial assets and contracts.  Financial intuition ERM also 
often involves a “stress test” or measure of the organization’s capacity to withstand risk.  
In the context of manufacturing firms ERM strategies have often focused on supply chain 
risks including risks from supply chain partners and third parties.  Manufacturing firm 
ERM also often focuses on the risks associated with innovation including the risks that 
innovation could make existing products obsolete and the risk that the firm could lose its 
technological advantage.  ERM has not been extensively applied in the context of 
agribusiness firms or agricultural cooperatives. 
Structure of Grain Marketing and Farm Supply Cooperatives 
According to USDA statistics there are 2,106 agricultural cooperatives operating 
in the U.S. with a combined membership of just under two million (USDA, 2016). 
Agricultural cooperatives serve as an extension of the farm firm providing economies of 
11 
 
scale in purchasing, services and commodity marketing.  A defining characteristic of the 
cooperative business model is that the firm is owned by its users, who share in profits in 
proportion to their use of the firm.  One category of agricultural cooperative which is 
particularly prevalent in the Central and Midwest U.S. is the grain marketing and farm 
supply cooperative.  As the name implies, these producer owned firms typically purchase, 
warehouse and apply fertilizer and crop protectants as well as receiving, storing and 
marketing grain and oilseed crops.   
Grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives typically attempt to maintain a 
predetermined per unit profit margin on both input sales and commodity purchases.  For 
example, a cooperative might strive to sell fertilizer at a $50/ton markup over their 
purchase price and purchase grains and oilseed crops at $.50/bushel less than they 
anticipated being able to sell it.  Because of this structure of per unit margins, grain and 
farm supply cooperatives would be expected to be impacted more from by changes in 
volume than from price changes.  Grain and farm supply cooperatives typically purchase 
fertilizer and other inputs in large lots to warehouse for later sales to producers.  They 
purchase lots of grain periodically from producers and then make bulk sales to regional 
terminal elevators, exporters or processing firms.  Because of that structure and time lag 
between purchase and sale they can experience changes their actual margins on inputs 
and commodities may vary relative to their anticipated margin.  Competitive pressure 
from other firms in their trade territory can also impact the margins that they are able to 
attain. 
Grain and farm supply cooperatives, like other firms, have historically used a 
number of strategies to limit their exposure to risks.  They purchase property and casualty 
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insurance to protect against losses involving their buildings, equipment and vehicles.  
They implement internal controls to prevent unauthorized actions and establish credit 
policies to limit the risk of uncollectable accounts receivable.  Due to the fact that both 
grain purchases and grain sales are based on the current daily market price, these 
cooperatives are exposed to price risk on any volume of grain that they have purchased 
from the producer and not re-sold up the marketing chain.  In recognition of this risk, 
most grain and farm supply cooperative have established policies limiting the amount of 
grain that the grain merchandiser can purchase without also purchasing the appropriate 
futures market contract to offset the market price risk.   
As these examples have suggested, grain and farm supply cooperatives have 
traditionally used a “silo approach” to risk management, maintaining separate strategies 
to maintain different types of risks.  Historically, these firms have not analyzed the 
aggregate risk facing the cooperative or formally considered their capacity to withstand 
risk.  There are a variety of factors which help explain the lack of a comprehensive 
strategy towards identifying and controlling risks.  Historically, the membership of grain 
and farm supply cooperatives consisted of relatively small scale producers.  This limited 
the scale of inputs that the cooperative had to purchase and warehouse and meant that 
most grain was sold in relatively small lots.  In addition, many grain marketing and farm 
supply cooperatives operated in stable trade territories without close competitors.  That 
environment, along with a market environment of relative stable fertilizer and grain 
prices, allowed them to maintain relatively stable per unit profit margins.  In more recent 
years these cooperatives have a subset of members who operate very large scale farming 
operations, increasing the volume of inputs warehoused and the scale of transactions.  In 
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addition, price volatility in both input and commodity markets has increased 
dramatically.  The competitiveness of the retail farm supply market price has also 
increased both due to competition between neighboring cooperatives, competition from 
investor owned firm and efforts by regional firms to bypass the local retailer and conduct 
transactions directly with producers.  Because of all of these factors, there is need for 
agricultural cooperatives to take a more comprehensive approach to risk management.  
Unfortunately, there are a number of impediments to applying the ERM framework to 
grain and farm supply cooperatives.  
Impediments of ERM in Grain Marketing and Farm Supply Cooperatives 
There are several possible impediments to an ERM strategy within grain 
marketing and farm supply cooperatives.  Three of these impediments are (1) lack of 
experience in quantifying risk, (2)lack of instruments to offset or control certain 
categories of risk, (3) Lack of efforts to systematically investigate the cooperative’ 
capacity to withstand risk and (4) Failure to consider profit distribution  and equity 
management decisions as part of risk management strategies. 
(1) Lack of experience in quantifying risk 
Cooperative boards of directors and CEOs are familiar with the fact that the 
cooperative’s financial performance varies dramatically across years due to weather, 
price changes and a wide range of other factors.  However, very few of these cooperative 
leaders have systematically explored the sources of those variations or attempted to 





(2) Lack of risk instruments 
Grain and farm supply cooperatives have historically used futures market 
contracts and other tools to limit the firm’s exposure to commodity price risk.  
Historically, similar tools for controlling the price risk of fertilizer and other inputs have 
not been available.  Additionally, year to year changes in precipitation and other weather 
factors create large variation in grain volumes and the associated handling and marketing 
margins.  For example, If the growing season was perfect with ideal weather conditions 
and crop inputs, a 160-acre piece of land in Oklahoma wheat crop with a 65 bu./acre 
yield would produce 10,400 bushels of wheat.   If in that year a bad storm caused some 
damage making the yield decrease to 20 bu. /acre that farm would only produce 3,200 
bushels of wheat.  Year to year yield variations of over 70% are not unusual at the 
producer level.  The impact on the entire firm is often someone less dramatic due to the 
averaging impact across producers but can still be dramatic.  In recent years, a limited 
number of over-the-counter fertilizer price contracts have developed along with 
derivative contracts based on county level rainfall.  These potential instruments to control 
fertilizer price risk and precipitation risk have not been adopted, partially due to the lack 
of information on their cost-benefit profile. 
(3) Lack of Analysis or Risk Capacity 
 The board of directors and CEOs of grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives 
have traditionally managed risks using a silo approach.  They have periodically 
considered separate categories of risk and tried to ascertain that the cooperative had a 
strategy in place to limit the risk exposure.  Historically, they have not attempted to 
measure the total aggregate risk exposure of the cooperative, quantify or prioritize 
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individual risk or measured the likelihood of aggregate risks exceeding the firm’s 
financial capacity to withstand them.  This has made it difficult for cooperative leaders to 
analyze new potential risk management instruments or alternative financial strategies 
which could increase risk capacity.   
(4) Failure to Integrate Profit Distribution and Equity Management Decisions into Risk 
Management Strategies 
 The decision of how profits will be distributed and retained and the decision on 
redeeming previously issued revolving equity are key functions of the cooperative board of 
directors.  Both of those decisions have major impacts on the cooperative’s cash flow (and thus 
its ability to sustain risk) and the members’ realized return from the cooperative.  In theory the 
board should balance the members’ desire for cash patronage and equity redemption payments 
with the cooperative’s need to maintain an adequate cash flow.  Ideally, under the principle that 
the owners are residual claimants, the board should reduce cash patronage levels and delay equity 
revolving payments when the cooperative experiences risk which severely reduces its cash flow.  
In practice, many boards do not consider the impact of profit distribution and equity management 
on the cooperative’s risk capacity and attempt to maintain constant profit distribution and equity 








One of the key steps to implementing ERM is to conduct an analysis to identify 
and prioritize the organization’s critical risks. Our methodology was designed to assist 
cooperatives with that process by investigating and simulating the total risks faced by 
typical grain and farm supply cooperatives and then determining the portion of risk 
attributable to major risk factors.   That information would be useful to cooperative 
leaders as they implemented the concept of enterprise risk management and assessed the 
major risk factors affecting their cooperative. The research also investigated the impact of 
changes in profit distribution and equity retirement on the cooperative’s risk. That 
information could help cooperative board of directors understand how they could impact 
their cooperative’s risk capacity through their key decisions on profit distribution and 
equity management. 
Risk Areas 
The major risk areas examined included variation in grain volume, grain margin, 
fertilizer volume, fertilizer margin, and petroleum volume and petroleum margin.  
Collectively, those activities represent the major revenue stream for grain marketing and 
farm supply cooperatives.  Those activities also involve homogeneous commodities 
which are more compatible with risk management strategies.  The remaining major 
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revenue streams for the case study cooperatives included the sale of seed and crop 
protectant chemicals and other miscellaneous income streams such as car washes, seed 
cleaning and trucking. On the audited financial statements, income from those activities 
is commonly classified as “Other Farm Supply Margins.” Seed and crop protectant sales 
involve a diverse product line with substantial variation in profit margin across products.  
The risks associated with those products and other miscellaneous revenue was not 
specifically investigated.  
Simulation Model and Data 
A six-year time series of financial and operating data was acquired from 10 
Oklahoma grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives.  Included in the data were 
physical units of grain, fertilizer, petroleum, and the profit margin for each commodity.  
The historical data was used to estimate normally distributed random variables for grain 
volume, grain margin, fertilizer volume, fertilizer margin, petroleum volume and 
petroleum margin.  Some other revenue generating activities such as grain storage 
income, fertilizer application revenue and patronage from regional cooperatives were 
linked to the random variables and were thus also indirectly stochastic.    
A cooperative financial simulation program developed at Oklahoma State 
University was used to develop a 30 year simulation for the case study cooperatives 
(Kenkel and Holcomb, 2005).  The simulations modeled the sales, expenses, profits and 
profit distributions of the firm and considered the cash flow required for infrastructure 
reinvestment and equity retirement.  Profit distribution (cash and retained equity) were 
based on the historic practices of each cooperative.  Equity revolvement (redeeming 
previously issued equity patronage into cash) was based on the equity profile and equity 
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management system (age of stock or age of patron) used by each cooperative. Patronage 
from regional cooperatives was projected from the historic relationship with farm supply 
sales with the split between cash and stock regional patronage based on historic averages.  
The cash portion of regional patronage is included in the projected profits and cash flows.  
No attempt was made to model redemption of regional patronage since several regional 
cooperatives are moving to base capital and/or permanent equity models. 
Fixed expense categories such as depreciation, maintenance and repairs, insurance 
and property tax were modeled based on their historic relationship with fixed asset levels.  
Personnel expense was based on the most recent fiscal year. Residual expenses (expenses 
not represented by those categories) were projected at their historical average value.  
Inventory and accounts receivable levels were modeled based on their historic 
relationship with farm supply sales.  Additional investment in fixed assets was modeled 
at a constant 5% growth rate.  This figure is a conservative approach as compared to the 
historic growth rate in fixed assets which averaged 12.1% for the case study cooperatives.  
The firm specific growth rates are not used because many of the case study cooperatives 
had replaced major assets such as grain bins or fertilizer warehouses during the previous 
six years.  It therefore seemed likely that their long term asset growth will be lower than 
their recent historical average.  The five percent fixed asset investment was roughly 
equivalent to the depreciation expense for most of the case study firms. 
Profiles of equity by age of patron or age of stock (as appropriate) were obtained 
for each cooperative.  Five of the ten case study cooperatives used an age of patron equity 
retirement system while the remainder used an age of stock system.  Equity retirement 
triggers ranged from 18-20 years for age of stock plans and from age 65 to age 70 for age 
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of patron plans.  The baseline profit distribution of cash patronage, retained qualified 
equity, and retained unallocated equity were based on historical patterns.  In cases where 
the cash patronage rates were not constant over the six year period of historic data, phone 
interviews with the CEOs were conducted to determine the most typical profit 
distribution. The percentage of nonmember business (which is not provided in the audited 
financial statements) was also obtained from the CEO interviews. An effective tax rate of 
9.4% was used for the cooperatives based on research by Russell and Briggeman (2014). 
The 10 Oklahoma cooperatives had an average of $12,875,703 in total assets, 
$7,872,893 in total equity with an average unallocated to total equity ratio of 57 percent.  
On average they had $2,552,687 in total working capital (current assets minus current 
liabilities). Total sales averaged $24,195,153 and 83.4 percent of sales were from 
member business.  As mentioned, the cooperatives had an average annual growth rate of 
total fixed assets of 12.1 percent. Exactly half of the cooperatives were on an age of 
patronage equity redemption system with an average age trigger of 67 years and while the 
other five were on an age of stock equity redemption system with an average revolving 
period of 20 years. 
Nine of the case study cooperatives distributed profits in a combination of cash 
and qualified stock, with the cash portion ranging from 21% to 50%.  One cooperative 
distributed a combination of cash and nonqualified stock with a 15% cash portion.  None 
of the case study cooperatives retained member profits in the form on unallocated equity 
but they all retained the after tax portion of nonmember profits as unallocated equity. 
Each cooperative’s historic system for profit distribution and equity retirement was used 
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in all of the simulated scenarios except the final scenarios where changes in cash 
patronage and equity revolving periods were specifically examined.    
Simulation Procedures 
 For each scenario a 30 year time series of pro-forma financial statements was 
created for each cooperative.  Various measures of risk were calculated for the 30 year 
projection periods.  Those measures included the standard deviation of cash flows, the 
minimum cash flow during the 30 year period and the frequency of a negative cash flow 
occurring during the projection period.  The simulations were repeated 500 times 
representing 15,000 years of projected financial results and the financial results were 
averaged over all of the simulations.   
In all, nine scenarios were investigated.  The first scenario was the baseline 
scenario with the volumes and margins for grain, fertilizer and petroleum represented by 
random draws from the respective distribution and profit distribution and equity 
management set at each cooperative’s historical baseline. The risk attributable to each 
risk factor (example: grain volume) was estimated by replacing the random variable for 
that risk factor with the average of the distribution and determining the change in the risk 
measures.  For example, the first case study cooperative could reduce cash flow standard 
deviation by 10% if they eliminated all variation in grain volume and by 8.5% if they 
were able to eliminate variation in grain margins. 
 In addition to the baseline scenario and six scenarios investigating risk factors, 
two additional scenarios investigated the impact of profit distribution and equity 
management decisions.  In the first scenario all risk factors were allowed to vary but the 
percentage of the total member based profits distributed as cash patronage was increased 
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by 10%.  For example, if the cooperative was distributing profits as 40% cash and 60% 
qualified stock, the profit distribution was changed to 50% cash and 50% qualified stock.  
Increasing cash patronage reduces a cooperative’s cash flow and would be expected to 
increase the occurrence of negative cash flows.  The final scenario was similar except 
that the profit distribution was returned to the respective baselines but the equity 
revolving period was reduced by 5 years.  For example, if the cooperative retired equity 
based on patron age 70, that trigger age was reduced to age 65.  Similarly, if the 
cooperative retired equity based on age of stock with a trigger stock age of 20 years, the 
trigger stock age was reduced to 15 years.  Accelerating the equity revolving cycle 
increases the member’s return but also reduces cash flow and would also be expected to 







A summary of the financial data from the case study cooperatives that was used in 
the simulation is provided in Table 1.  The cooperatives varied in size from 850,000 
bushels of grain sales to almost 42 million bushels. All of the cooperatives had activities 
in marketing grain, and providing fertilizer and petroleum.  The relative importance of 
those activities in terms of sales margins generated varied widely across the cooperatives.  
All but one cooperative applied fertilizer.  Because the cooperative used different audit 
firms there not perfect consistency across the minor categories.  For example, the reports 
on two cooperatives did not separate sales and margins for “other farm supply” items but 
instead presumable included those margins in other income.  Similarly, many of the 
financial statements did not separate membership stock, which is typically not revolving 
equity, from common stock which is typically revolving equity created through retained 
patronage.  Membership stock is typically a very small percentage of allocated equity so 
the impact on projecting equity revolving cash flows was minimal. 
In terms of the simulating risk, the key data was the standard deviations in volume 
and margins for the marketing and input commodities.  As the table indicates, those 
standard deviations varied widely across cooperatives.  For example, the standard 
deviation of grain volume, as a percentage of the mean ranged from 14.5% to 46.4% 
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while the standard deviation in grain margin ranged from 25.1% to 64.4%.  On average, 
grain margins had the highest variation followed by grain volume, petroleum volume, 
fertilizer margin, fertilizer volume and petroleum volume.  The level of variation in 
margin or volume should not be interpreted as a measure of the relative risk of the 
activities since additional income streams such as fertilizer application and grain storage 
were associated with commodity volumes and the commodity areas made up different 
proportions of overall income.  It was also interesting to note that patronage from 
regional cooperatives, as a percent of farm supply sales, varied substantially across the 
cooperatives.  That likely reflected the differences in product mixes and differences in 




Table 1: Financial Data for Case Study Cooperatives Used in Simulation Model 
Cooperative A B C D E 
Grain volume  2,296,673  1,648,261  2,486,990   849,597  1,523,778  
grain volume std/mean 19.0% 30.2% 46.4% 42.2% 14.5% 
grain margin  $ 0.48   $0.27   $0.48   $ 0.29   $0.61  
Grain margin std/mean 25.6% 39.4% 23.9% 42.0% 30.0% 
Fertilizer volume 7,069  5,137  5,017  3,315  10,026  
fertilizer  volume std/mean 15.4% 14.0% 9.4% 16.6% 10.3% 
fertilizer margin $ 63.2 $123.00 $73.84 $133.39 $55.54 
fertilizer margin std/mean 20.0% 20.0% 16.5% 36.5% 18.7% 
Petroleum volume 1,820,166  1,402,350  1,605,819   442,259  810,260  
Petroleum volume std/mean 55.2% 40.8% 44.7% 13.6% 9.4% 
Petroleum margin $0.21 $0.25 $0.20 $0.17 $0.20 
Petroleum margin std/mean 4.9% 1.2% 4.3% 4.0% 4.2% 
Other Farm Supply sales $ 3,536,198   $448,657   $0  $ 0   $2,499,985  
Other farm supply % margin 25.8% 25.8%   15.7% 
Grain storage per bushel $0.20 $0.20 $ 0.23 $ 0.18 $0.14 
Grain storage std dev $ 0.04 $ 0.06 $ 0.11 $ 0.08 $ 0.02 
Fertilizer application per ton $55.3 $0 $76.2 $56.0 $38.4 
Other Income  $335,617   $278,239   $266,605   $90,000   $716,451  
Reg. cash pat/supply margin 22.3% 18.1% 22.3% 11.5% 7.2% 
Reg. stock pat/supply margin 21.7% 14.4% 21.7% 19.8% 6.0% 
Personnel Expense  $1,617,712   $733,008   $990,991   $473,918   $ 938,192  
Maintenance/Fixed assets 9.8% 3.7% 27.7% 0.0% 0.7% 
Depreciation/Fixed assets 16.7% 5.0% 13.9% 16.8% 4.2% 
Insurance/Fixed assets 6.0% 7.5% 5.9% 0.0% 2.4% 
Prop Tax/Fixed assets 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 7.2% 0.5% 
Fixed assets  $1,560,159   $1,316,920   $243,820   $662,579   $6,395,703  
Accounts Rec./Agron. Sales 6.4% 5.6% 2.5% 6.8% 7.3% 
Inv. to Agronomy Sales 15.0% 6.0% 12.0% 11.0% 75.0% 
Other Income   $20,000   $18,003   $0 -     $32,214   $0 
Membership stock  $96,800   $0  $0  $0     $0 
Qualified stock  $1,257,044   $1,017,475   $1,795,697   $1,223,689   $645,587  
Non Qualified stock  $ 0  $ 0  $0  $0  $0 
Unallocated equity  $ 2,769,317   $3,239,131   $2,769,317   $ 819,117   $ 1,876,496  





Table 1: Financial Data for Case Study Cooperatives Used in Simulation Model-Continued 
Cooperative F G H I J Average 
Grain volume 2,558,901  4,101,373  41,833,341  2,949,937  1,145,961  6,139,481  
grain vol std/mean 26.2% 23.8% 19.5% 51.2% 37.2% 31.0% 
grain margin  $0.22   $ 0.49   $ 0.15   $0.28   $0.78   $ 0.41  
Grain mar std/mean 25.1% 25.8% 37.9% 49.5% 64.4% 36.4% 
Fertilizer volume 14,586  11,381  38,212  8,917  10,149  11,381  
Fert. Vol. std/mean 18.5% 14.0% 11.1% 36.5% 24.5% 17.0% 
fertilizer margin  $67.30   $63.25   $81.43   $59.74   $60.00   $78.07  
Fert. mar std/mean 15.8% 20.0% 26.3% 18.9% 45.3% 23.8% 
Petroleum volume 1,820,166   2,149,000   9,798,216   310,753  1,334,743   2,149,373  
Petro. vol. std/mean 20.6% 0.1% 21.7% 65.4% 29.0% 30.0% 
Petroleum margin  $0.20   $0.21   $0.18   $0.17   $0.13   $0.19  
Petro. mar std/mean 5.3% 1.0% 4.5% 3.4% 6.0% 3.9% 




$7,753,268 $2,166,406   $2,713,011   $1,910,165   $2,655,548  
Other farm supply 
% mar. 
16.0% 9.5% 14.8% 13.0% 13.7% 18.6% 
Grain storage/ bul  $0.19   $0.20   $0.01   $0.20   $0.19   $0.17  
Grain stor std dev  $0.05   $0.05   $0.00   $0.10   $0.07   $0.06  
Fertilizer app. /ton  $27.5   $0  $23.4   $14.6   $77.8   $36.9  
Other Income $2,078,66
8  
 $817,463   $1,777,368   $1,288,504   $1,913,927   $956,284  
Reg. cash pat/supply 
mar. 
7.7% 33.8% 18.0% 10.7% 13.8% 16.5% 
Reg. stock 
pat/supply mar. 
11.7% 35.7% 27.0% 5.8% 19.5% 18.3% 
Personnel Expense $2,113,81
3  
 $1,239,713   $4,738,000   $1,185,442   $1,922,041   $1,598,283  
Main./Fixed assets 8.0% 6.0% 15.6% 5.9% 0.8% 7.8% 
Dep.Fixed assets 19.6% 14.4% 11.4% 12.1% 3.5% 11.8% 
Ins./Fixed assets 5.9% 0.0% 5.2% 14.9% 1.9% 5.0% 
Prop Tax/Fixed 
assets 
1.66% 0.0% 1.8% 4.0% 0.4% 2.2% 
Fixed assets $3,160,34
1 
 $2,000,900   $6,323,641   $1,295,495  $14,136,021   $3,709,558  
Acc. Rec./Agr Sales 6.1% 10.5% 5.5% 13.9% 10.3% 7.5% 
Inv. to Agr.. Sales 15.0% 47.0% 9.0% 17.0% 27.0% 23.4% 
Other Income   $7,629  $0  $761,463   $29,085   $58,883   $103,031  
Membership stock $0 $0  $0 $0  $0  $13,829  
Qualified stock $2,679,62
7  
 $2,151,452   $7,643,772   $931,394   $2,566,926   $2,191,266  
Non Qualified stock  $ 0  $0  $0   $0   $0  $0  
Unallocated equity $4,312,88
5  
 $2,014,587   $9,706,274   $2,088,732   $2,225,249   $3,182,111  
Debt/asset 5.3% 10.5% 2.1% 10.9% 15.0% 7.8% 
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A summary of the average annual cash flow, the minimum annual cash flow 
observed over the 6 year historical period and the average annual cash patronage and 
equity revolving payments are provided in Table 2 below.  Annual cash flow averaged 
$117,332 over all of the case study firms.  Three cooperatives averaged negative cash 
flows during the historical data period indicating they reduced their overall cash balances.  
Only one of the case study firms did not experience a year with a negative cash flow 
during the six years of historical data.  Cash patronage payments averaged $307,271 
across all firms while payments to revolve previously issued equity averaged $122,136.  
Annual cash patronage payments averaged 3.6 times annual cash flow while equity 
payments average 2.6 times annual cash flow.  Across the 6 years of data for the 10 
cooperatives there were 16 occurrences of negative cash flows. The respective 
cooperative paid cash patronage in 14 of those 16 years and retired equity in all 16 of 
those years. Taken together those results suggests that profit distribution and equity 
management decisions could have substantial impact on occurrence of negative cash 
flows but those decisions do not appear to be used as tools to stabilize cash flows. 
 













A  $    (16,878)  $      (193,307)  $      119,490   $     78,124  
B  $     92,922   $      (753,578)  $      271,406   $     64,024  
C  $   118,232   $      (409,617)  $      306,382   $   121,236  
D  $     14,330   $      (121,096)  $      262,928   $   200,390  
E  $   111,526   $        104,466   $        97,145   $     81,804  
F  $   677,132   $      (639,183)  $      253,082   $     81,804  
G  $       8,398   $          (3,746)  $      115,075   $   106,653  
H  $   305,543   $   (1,470,506)  $   1,526,690   $   448,595  
I  $    (48,057)  $      (229,721)  $          7,329   $       7,177  
J  $    (89,827)  $      (469,879)  $        58,990   $     31,550  
Average  $   117,332   $      (418,617)  $      307,271   $   122,136  
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The relative importance of the various business areas varied substantially across 
cooperatives (Table 3).    Margins from storing and marketing grain accounted for 73% of 
the total margins for Cooperative G and only 28% of total margins for Cooperative B.  
Margins from supplying and applying fertilizer (which was classified as “Agronomy”) 
ranged from 0% to 58% of total margins.  It should be noted that the inconsistencies in 
the format of the audited financial statements made it difficult to separate fertilizer 
related margins from the “Other Farm Supply” category.  The importance of the “Other 
Farm Supply” department ranged from 0% to 32% of total margin.  One of the case study 
cooperatives operated a retail hardware store and another operated a retail home and 
garden store.  The cooperatives also varied in their emphasis on providing seed and crop 
protection chemicals.  Petroleum related activities did not represent the largest source of 
gross margin for any of the case study cooperatives but did account for over 15% of total 
margins for three of the ten case study firms. 
 
Table 3: Department Margin Percentage of Total Gross Margin by Cooperative 
Coop Grain Petroleum Agronomy/Fertilizer Other Farm supply 
A 38.76% 13.44% 15.72% 32.09% 
B 28.84% 22.72% 40.94% 7.50% 
C 63.32% 17.03% 19.65% 0.00% 
D 32.26% 9.84% 57.90% 0.00% 
E 45.56% 7.94% 27.29% 19.20% 
F 20.16% 13.04% 35.16% 31.64% 
G 73.18% 0.00% 0.002% 26.82% 
H 54.71% 15.38% 27.13% 2.79% 
I 46.82% 2.99% 30.20% 19.99% 




The average correlation coefficients between the commodities comprising the risk 
factors are provided in Table 4.  The volumes of grain, fertilizer and petroleum were 
mildly correlated suggesting that when weather, or other events decrease grain volume 
producers also reduce fertilizer and petroleum purchases.  Some of that correlation was 
likely due to the fact that the cooperatives were, in general, increasing handling volumes 
of all commodities over the time period of the historical data.  The correlations between 
commodity volumes implies that the total risk facing the case study cooperatives could be 
slightly higher than our model indicated since the volume risks in one commodity had a 
positive association with the volume risk of another commodity.   
The correlations between volume and margin for grain and fertilizer were 
negative and small in magnitude.  That implies that when factors caused the cooperative’s 
volumes of those commodities to decline the cooperative was able, to a small extent, to 
increase margins.  In that regard our model may overstate risk since the margin 
movements serve to slightly offset the impact of reduced volumes.  The correlation 
between petroleum volume and margin was very small in magnitude (.04) and positive, 
suggesting that cooperatives are forced to slightly lower their fuel margins when their 
fuel volumes decline.  Because of the fact that all of the correlations were small, and were 
based on a limited time series (6 years) of historical data, our model did not consider 
correlations between commodity volumes or commodity prices and volumes and modeled 





Table 4: Average Correlation Between Commodities and Between Commodity 
Volumes and Margins 
Grain volume/fertilizer volume 0.13 
Grain volume/petroleum Volume 0.15 
Fertilizer volume/petroleum volume 0.16 
Grain volume/grain margin -0.09 
Fertilizer volume/fertilizer margin -0.11 
Petroleum volume/Petroleum margin 0.04 
 
Baseline Results 
The baseline scenario, averaged across the 10 case study cooperatives is provided 
in Table 5. On average the standard deviation of cash flows was 53% of average cash 
flow.  If the cash flow variation were distributed normally that would imply that there 
was a 32% probability that the cooperatives cash flow could be reduced by 53% and a 5% 
probability that it could be reduced by 106%, implying a negative cash flow.  That was 
consistent with the frequency of occurrences of negative cash flows in the simulations 
which average 1.63 times or in around 5% of the 30 year projected period for each 
cooperative. It should be noted that the occurrence of negative cash flows in the 
simulation models (approximately 5%) was lower than the occurrence of negative cash 
flows from the audited financial statements (approximately 25%).  The primary reason 
was that the simulation model did not consider variation in income from other farm 
supply sales, miscellaneous income categories or variation in the cash patronage rates of 
regional cooperatives.   
On average, the member’s IRR was 15.91%.  The member IRR would not be 
expected to be impacted by the various risk scenarios since those scenarios involved 
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replacing normally distributed random variables for price and volume with the mean of 
distribution.  The member IRR would be expected to be impacted by changes in cash 
patronage and the equity revolving period.  Those decisions also impact the cooperative’s 
cash flows and the risk of negative cash flows. 
 
Table 5: Baseline Results 
 Average Range 
Average Cash Flow $1,598,263 $485,484 to $6,107,384 
Cash flow standard deviation $843,047 $296,752 to $2,618,983 
Minimum cash during 
projection period 
$89,399 -$524,791 to $1,324,839 
Number of years of negative 
cash flow in projection 
period 
1.63 0 to 5.6 
Member Internal Rate of 
Return 
15.91% Negative to 27.5% 
 
Results from Risk Scenarios 
The impact of the six risk reducing scenarios and the two financial management 
scenarios are provided in Table 6.  As expected, the six scenarios which eliminated 
particular risk components did not impact the average cash flow of the cooperative or the 
members IRR.   Increasing the percent of cash patronage substantially decreased the 
cooperatives cash flow and increased the member’s IRR.    Accelerating the equity 
revolving period also reduced the average cash flow and increased the member’s IRR but 
the impact was less drastic. 
Grain volume was the largest risk factor for the case study cooperatives.  On 
average, the cooperatives could have reduced the standard deviation of their cash flows 
by 20.33% and reduced the occurrence of negative cash flows by 39.23% if they could 
eliminate that risk factor.  Grain volume, which is largely due to weather and production 
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risk, would be expected to be a major risk factor.  Grain handling involves a large portion 
of fixed costs, so the residual profits and cash flows would be expected to be heavily 
dependent on volume.  On average, grain margin was the second largest source of risk 
accounting for 12.89% of the cash flow standard deviation and 24.62% of the occurrence 
of negative cash flows. Grain and farm supply cooperatives attempt to maintain a fixed 
per-unit margin in their grain handling operations so the relevant importance of grain 
margin risk is somewhat surprising.  When a cooperative purchases grain from a producer 
they generally either immediately sell it up the supply chain (back to back) or have a 
sales price protected via a forward contract position.  Their realized grain margin can still 
vary due to changes in the basis, inaccuracy of grading and changes in transportation 
rates.  Competitive pressures can also influence grain margin when a cooperative reduces 
margins in an attempt to attract bushels. Grain quality loss due to insects and other factors 
can also reduce grain margins but is generally not a significant factor in well managed 
elevators.   
The next most important risk factor was variation in fertilizer margin which, on 
average, accounted for 5.84% of cash flow variation and 18.57% of instances of negative 
cash flows.  Grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives also attempt to maintain a 
constant per unit (per ton) profit margin in fertilizer.  However they purchase and 
inventory a substantial portion of their volume prior to the application seasons.  Variation 
in fertilizer prices can impact their margins because, unlike grain where the producers 
have already delivered to the elevator, producers have access to alternative suppliers.  If 
fertilizer prices fall after a cooperative purchases and inventories fertilizer they may be 
forced to reduce their margin to meet the price of a competitor who is purchasing 
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inventory on a “hand to mouth” basis.  Conversely, if prices rise the cooperative may be 
able to increase margins if the competition did not have the foresight to preposition 
inventory.  Fertilizer volume was the next major risk factor representing 2.92% of cash 
flow standard deviation and 6.87% of the risk of negative cash flows.  The volume of 
fertilizer demanded is impacted by weather, and to a lesser extend commodity prices.  
However, because fertilizer is applied at planting and in the middle of the growing 
season, year to year usage is more constant than grain volume. 
 Variation in the volume of petroleum products sold and the profit margin on 
those products was not, on average, a major source or risk for the case study 
cooperatives.  That reflects the fact, that while there was significant year to year variation 
in petroleum volumes and margins, that activity represented a modest portion of overall 
margins for the case study cooperatives. 
Table 6: Impact of Various Risk Components or Management Practice on Cash Flow 






Change in Number 





Grain Vol, 0.39% -20.33% -39.23% -0.53% 
Grain Mar. 0.05% -12.89% -24.62% -0.27% 
Fertilizer Vol -0.05% -2.92% -6.87% -0.17% 
Fertilizer Mar. 0.16% -5.84% -18.57% -0.45% 
Petro Vol. -0.04% -0.02% 1.07% -0.01% 
Petro Mar. -0.37% -0.68% -4.08% -0.39% 
Increase Cash -14.85% -13.22% 1.15`% 47.30% 
Accelerate 
Revolve 
-1.22% 0.96% 7.02% 4.30% 
 
The change in risk, as measured by change in the standard deviations in cash 
flow, with each risk factor or management change is shown for each case study 
cooperative in Table 7.  The relative importance of each risk component varied 
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considerably across the case study cooperatives.  For example, grain volume accounted 
for 2.2% of cash flow standard deviations for Cooperative E and 53.2% for Cooperative 
C.  As the previous results from Table 3 indicated, grain margins represented a 
substantial portion of total margins for those cooperatives.  In addition, the results likely 
reflected the difference in weather patterns impacting the cooperatives.  Some of the case 
study cooperatives were in Southwest Oklahoma which is typically more susceptible to 
drought relative to the North Central and Central regions of the state.   For all of the 
cooperatives the major risk factor was either grain volume, grain margin or fertilizer 
margin.  Fertilizer margin appeared to be a more important source of risk for cooperatives 
D and B.  Fertilizer margins represented a much higher portion of total margins for those 
cooperatives relative to the other firms.  In addition, the results could reflect differences 
in the percent of their volume that they are able to purchase prior to application season 
and warehouse, and/or competitive pressures from other suppliers. 
 
 
Table 7: Change in Cash Flow Standard from Risk Component or Management Strategy 


















 A -10.1% -8.5% -2.5% -2.4% -0.2% -2.3% -8.5% 4.0% 
 B -24.1% -12.9% -5.3% -11.5% -1.2% -1.3% -13.4% 0.2% 
 C -53.2% -5.1% -1.3% -0.2% -1.3% -1.5% -24.0% 1.1% 
 D -14.1% -5.1% -5.5% -22.8% 0.5% 0.8% -13.1% 1.3% 
 E -9.2% -21.7% -2.4% -4.1% -0.6% 0.0% -18.3% -0.8% 
 F -2.2% 0.3% -2.5% -0.7% 0.8% 0.8% -8.0% 3.0% 
 G -28.0% -14.9% 1.4% 0.2% 1.3% 0.4% -10.3% 0.4% 
 H -9.8% -31.8% -1.3% -7.7% -0.1% -2.9% -13.2% 0.8% 
 I -45.3% -13.2% -5.6% -2.8% -1.3% -1.5% -9.9% -1.5% 
 J -7.4% -16.0% -4.2% -6.2% 1.9% 0.9% -13.4% 1.2% 




 The change in the occurrence of negative cash flows from risk components and 
management strategy is provided in Table 8.  This risk measures illustrates the impact of 
cooperative’s ability to sustain risk.  It should be recalled that the average occurrence of 
negative cash flows, averaged across all cooperatives, was 1.63 over the 30 year 
projection period.  The changes in negative cash flow occurrence, while sometimes 
significant on a percentage basis were relatively small.  Two of the case study 
cooperatives did not experience negative cash flows under the baseline (all risk 
components) scenario and eliminating the risk components obviously made no reduction 
in the negative cash flow occurrence.  In terms of risk components, grain volume had the 
largest impact on negative cash flow occurrence followed by grain margin and fertilizer 
margin.  Eliminating variation in grain volume would have eliminated all of the 
occurrences of negative cash flows for Cooperative B and 94% of the occurrences for 
Cooperative G.  
 On average, accelerating the revolving period increased the occurrence of 
negative cash flows by 7%.  That indicated that equity management had a relatively small 
impact of negative cash flow occurrence.  It should be noted that most of the case study 
cooperatives had relatively long revolving period so the one-year acceleration was a 
relatively small change.  On average, increasing the percentage of profits distributed as 
cash patronage by 5% increased the occurrence of negative cash flows by 1.1%.  The 
effect of profit distribution was somewhat complex.  Increasing the percentage of cash 
patronage implied a lower percentage of revolving stock patronage.  In the case of the 
cooperatives with shorter revolving periods the lower cash flows for equity revolving in 
the later years of the simulation sometimes reduced the occurrence of negative cash flows 
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in those years.  That led to somewhat ambiguous results as the impact of cash patronage 
on negative cash flow occurrence.  In actual cooperatives, the board of directors would 
likely adjust cash patronage in a year where a negative cash flow was imminent, so the 
simulation strategy of a permanent change in profit allocation was not entirely realistic.  
 



















A 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
B -59.2% -22.4% -3.9% -28.4% 3.3% 3.5% -2.6% 5.1% 
C -100.0% 0.2% -5.0% -6.8% 4.6% -12.6% -3.8% 37.7% 
D -44.5% -12.9% -16.2% -74.4% 2.2% 1.6% -1.6% 8.6% 
E -14.1% -29.9% -1.6% -3.7% 2.1% -3.0% 11.1% -2.8% 
F 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
G -94.0% -51.7% -0.7% 2.6% 0.7% -1.5% -1.1% 2.6% 
H 0.0% -100.0% -23.5% -64.7% -2.9% -29.4% 0.0% 17.6% 
I -78.0% -18.1% -11.7% -6.2% -0.8% -0.4% -4.7% 1.7% 
J -2.5% -11.4% -6.0% -4.1% 1.6% 1.0% 14.2% -0.3% 
Avg. -39.2% -24.6% -6.9% -18.6% 1.1% -4.1% 1.1% 7.0% 
 
The change in the members’ IRR from the cooperative from changes in profit 
distribution and equity revolving cycle is summarized in Table 9. Cooperative H was 
indicated to have a negative member IRR at baseline and after the changes in cash 
patronage and equity revolving cycle.  It was therefore not possible to determine the 
impact on member IRR from the cash patronage or revolving cycle change for that 
cooperative. Increasing the percentage of profits distributed as cash patronage had a 
relatively dramatic positive impact on the member’s IRR.  It is interesting to note that the 
cooperatives which demonstrated the largest impact (Cooperatives A, E and J, also 
experienced large increases in cash flow standard deviation and negative cash flow 
occurrence from the cash patronage increase.  Accelerating the equity revolving period 
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also increased member IRR but the results were less dramatic.  Taken together, the results 
highlight the temptation of cooperative boards of directors (who are elected from the 
membership) to maximize cash patronage and accelerate equity retirement.  The previous 
results have shown the resulting impact on the risk capacity of the cooperative. 
Table 9: Change in Member IRR Due to Change in Cash Patronage or 




Accelerating Revolving Cycle 
A …41.65% 18.31% 
B 32.51% 0.01% 
C 24.51% 10.92% 
D 49.81% 2.73% 
E 61.98% 0.20% 
F 57.19% 11.81% 
G NA NA 
H 49.97% 22.81 
I 39.15% -1.36% 
J 77.76% -0.01% 









IMPLICATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This simulation based research, which was based on financial and operating data 
from ten grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives, demonstrates how the principles 
of ERM could help cooperatives leaders analyze and manage risks.  The research 
identified some major risk areas for grain and farm supply cooperatives which included 
grain volume, grain margin and fertilizer margins.  Variation in fertilizer volume, 
petroleum volume and petroleum margin were shown to be less significant sources of 
risk.  The implication of those results is that grain and farm supply cooperatives could 
benefit from using a comprehensive approach to evaluating risk across their marketing 
and supply activities.   
The results indicated positive but relative small correlations between grain 
volume, fertilizer volume and petroleum volumes.  Those correlations suggest that 
volume risks are interrelated across commodities.   The results also indicated negative 
and small magnitude correlations between price and volume variation within the 
commodities.  That suggests that grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives have 
little opportunity to offset lower volumes with higher margins.  This research did not 
attempt to model correlations in volumes across commodities or any interaction between 
volume and price variation.  Due to the small magnitude of those correlations, those 
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relations likely had a small impact on overall risk.  A more complex simulation model 
which fully incorporated correlations across risk areas and between prices and volumes 
could be a topic of further research. 
An important contribution of the research was the observation that the relative 
risk areas varied fairly dramatically across the case study firms.  While variation in grain 
margin had the largest risk impact on average, variation in grain margin was the most 
significant risk factor for one cooperative and fertilizer margin was the leading risk area 
for another of the case study firms.  That result suggests that risk management strategies 
for grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives are not a “one size fits all” situation but 
instead, must be tailored to each cooperative.   
In this research, two measures of risk were considered: cash flow standard 
deviation and occurrence of negative cash flows.  Results on other measures such as 
average cash flow and minimum cash flow were calculated and are presented in the 
Appendix.  In general, all of the risk measures led to similar conclusions as to the relative 
importance of the risk areas across the case study cooperatives. The baseline results 
illustrated a relative low probability of negative cash flow occurring (1.63 times out of 30 
years, on average).  Cooperative boards of directors are likely concerned with less 
extreme thresholds such as maintaining a specified amount of cash or working capital as 
specified by their lender in the loan covenants.  The negative cash flow occurrence 
measure did emphasize the fact that some risk areas, such as petroleum volume and 
margins, are often not large enough to impact the cooperative’s overall risk position. 
As in many studies, this research has also highlighted additional questions which 
present opportunities for further research.   While grain volume was indicated to be a 
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significant risk measure, this research did not investigate whether the mix of summer 
crops and winter crops affected grain volume variability.  While a cooperative could not 
impact its member’s cropping decisions, identifying any relationship between cropping 
mix and grain volume variability might allow the cooperative to anticipate changes in 
grain volume risk exposure. 
A cooperative’s grain margin, which was also a major source of risk, is impacted 
by numerous factors including accuracy in grain grading, merchandising strategies, grain 
shrinkage and transportation costs.  Additional research could be conducted to better 
understand the underlying causes of variation of grain margins across marketing years.  
That information would be useful to cooperatives that were designing strategies to 
mitigate grain margin risk. There are also a similar number of factors which could lead to 
difference in fertilizer margins including differences in purchasing strategies (when to 
purchase and inventory fertilizer), warehouse size, shrinkage, discounts for advances 
purchase, volume or cash payment and transportation costs.  As in the case of grain 
margins, further research could be conducted to better understand the underlying causes 
of fertilizer margin risk which would improve the design of strategies to mitigate those 
risks. 
These results highlighted the fact that board and management decisions such as 
the cash patronage percentage and the equity revolving period can have a large impact on 
both the cooperative’s risk capacity and the member’s return.  This research investigated 
the impact of a constant change in those variables which was maintained for the entire 
projection period.  Cooperative boards of directors could also adjust cash patronage 
and/or equity revolving strategies on a year-to-year basis in response to risk or cash flow 
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triggers.  Modeling and investigating the impact of those strategies would be a worthy 
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Number of years 
negative cash flow in 
projection period 
Member IRR 
A $1,589,841  $547,476  $425,176  0.0 19.2% 
B $485,484  $306,284  $24,638  1.3 15.2% 
C $714,550  $490,863  ($377,499) 1.3 24.7% 
D $394,331  $269,752  ($322,226) 1.5 6.7% 
E $455,262  $359,065  $44,667  3.2 27.5% 
F $2,697,547  $988,330  $810,675  0.0 9.0% 
G $2,011,233  $1,157,916  ($518,333) 0.5 - 
H $6,107,384  $2,618,983  $1,324,839  0.1 13.3% 
I $894,604  $826,663  ($524,701) 2.8 19.1% 
J $632,295  $865,137  $6,755  5.6 8.5% 
 
 














A $175  $5,134  $2,003  $276  ($3,280) ($6,983) 
B ($812) ($2,345) ($4,339) ($1,956) ($501) ($2,448) 
C ($1,642) ($7,849) ($12,047) ($5,238) ($14,693) ($5,727) 
D $6,208  $4,381  $6,471  $8,085  $4,814  $470  
E $1,156  $1,427  $10  $1,520  ($820) $2,014  
F $1,667  ($2,697) ($511) ($2,368) $3,274  $2,480  
G $13,185  $8,739  $9,192  $5,638  $16,741  $8,934  
H ($11,282) ($6,733) $45,732  ($5,848) $18,982  ($18,273) 
I $24,393  ($2,080) ($5,241) $302  ($6,895) ($3,284) 
J ($4,919) $2,026  ($2,142) $1,432  $3,008  ($14,807) 






Table A3: Actual Change from Baseline in Cash Flow Standard Deviation by Cooperative 









A ($55,150) ($46,756) ($13,555) ($13,039) ($969) ($12,453) 
B ($73,662) ($39,644) ($16,190) ($35,370) ($3,794) ($4,029) 
C ($260,931) ($24,866) ($6,387) ($779) ($6,174) ($7,524) 
D ($38,006) ($13,671) ($14,924) ($61,614) $1,434  $2,045  
E ($32,906) ($77,892) ($8,713) ($14,627) ($2,272) ($117) 
F ($21,866) $3,157  ($24,427) ($7,155) $7,566  $7,608  
G ($323,802) ($172,706) $16,167  $1,876  $15,106  $4,403  
H ($257,209) ($831,708) ($34,148) ($202,013) ($1,769) ($76,986) 
I ($374,671) ($108,789) ($46,333) ($23,509) ($10,530) ($12,558) 
J ($64,287) ($138,802) ($36,095) ($53,893) $16,245  $8,032  





Table A4: Actual Change  from Baseline in Occurrence of Negative Cash by Cooperative 











A 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
B -0.8 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.0 
C -1.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 
D -0.7 -0.2 -0.2 -1.1 0.0 0.0 
E -0.5 -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 
F 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
G -0.5 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
H 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
I -2.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
J -0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.1 





















A -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% 
B 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
C -0.4% -0.4% -0.2% -0.1% 0.0% -0.1% 
D -0.1% 0.0% 0.1% -0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
E 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
F 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
G 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
H 2.9% 2.9% 2.8% 2.9% 2.9% 2.8% 
I -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.1% -0.1% 
J 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 




















A 0% 50% 50% 0% 
B 0% 50% 50% 0% 
C 0% 70% 30% 0% 
D 0% 50% 50% 0% 
E 0% 50% 50% 0% 
F 0% 50% 50% 0% 
G 0% 21% 79% 0% 
H 0% 50% 50% 0% 
I 0% 15% 0% 85% 
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